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Abstract 
 
We  aim  to  bridge  three  (plus  one)  levels  of  (strategic)  management  theory  of  value 
capture  and  sustainable  value  creation;  micro  (firm),  meso  (industry,  region),  macro 
(national) (and also global). We propose a framework for value creation by firms and 
explore  firm  strategies  for  value  capture  and  their  relationship  to  value  creation.  We 
construct requisite variables and test our framework for 17 OECD countries using panel 
data.  We  find  support  for  our  integrative  framework.  We  also  explore  the  issue  of 
sustainability and its implications for managerial practises, corporate governance, public 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the great paradoxes of (strategic) management literature is a failure to bridge 
micro, meso and macro determinants of value creation. In particular, there is extensive 
discussion of theories of value creation at the firm level (notably transaction costs and the 
resource-based view (RBV)), prescriptions for value capture by firms, notably Michael 
Porter’s approach and the RBV, some theories of value capture at the industry level, 
notably M. Porter’s five-forces model, and some, but not extensive yet, work on national 
competitiveness,  for  example,  M.  Porter’s  Competitive  Advantage  of  Nations. 
Paradoxically there is very little by way of the three-level interactions, surprisingly not 
even within the work of authors who have dealt with two or all three levels separately. It 
is notable, for example, that Porter’s (1980, 1985, 1990) books address issues of value 
creation and capture (productivity and competitiveness) on all three levels, yet there is 
little by way of integration. 
 
The call for papers of this special research forum on ‘Building Bridges Across Levels’ 
provides an excellent opportunity to deal with these lacunae in (strategic) management. It 
is our aim in this paper to contribute in this direction. 
 
Bridging levels has its intrinsic value but not just. It may also reveal new issues and 
research questions that could be overlooked when interactions are not considered. An 
important question, for example, is the relationship between value capture by firms and 
nations,  and sustainable global value creation. Such issues require multi-level analysis. 
 
In Section 2 we discuss value creation and capture at the firm and industry levels. We 
explores the nature and determinants of value creation, by drawing on extant industrial 
organisation  (IO)  and  (strategic)  management  literature.  We  discuss  the  relationship 
between value creation and value capture, and explore its implications on sustainable 
value creation. Section 3 extends the analysis to the meso (industry, region) and then the 
national levels. Our claim is that the same variables that effect value creation at the micro 
level, when suitably adapted and extended, may also explain value creation on the macro   4 
levels.  In  this  context  we  also  explore  the  issue  of  value  capture  by  nations  and  its 
implication on sustainable global value creation. 
 
In Section 4 we construct macro variables, derived from our analysis, and perform a test 
of the determinants of value creation for 17 OECD countries. Our results provide support 
for the integrated framework developed in this paper. Section 5 discusses the importance 
and implication of sustainability, while Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
VALUE CREATION AND CAPTURE OF FIRMS 
 
Interest  on  value  creation  by  firms  goes  as  far  back  as  Adam  Smith’s  (1776),  ‘pin 
factory’, and include influential contemporary management thinkers such as Moran and 
Ghoshal, (1999). Value creation and capture by firms is a currently popular theme in the 
resource-based view (RBV) debate of the theory of the firm, see for example Kor and 
Mahoney (2004). However, there is very little discussion on the determinants of value 
creation, at the firm level, and its link to the meso and macro levels-our aim in this paper.  
 
The  literature  in  economic,  IO  and  strategic  management  points  to  four  major 
determinants  of  value  creation  at  the  firm  level  –  human  resources,  technology  and 
innovation, unit costs economics and the infra-structure and strategy of the firm. These 
are summarized in Figure 1. The literature on these determinants is large, so we have to 
be selective. First, innovation and technology is widely seen as a major determinant of 
value creation. Its importance goes back to Adam Smith’s pin factory, where invention is 
a crucial factor for productivity increases, but reached its apotheosis with Schumpeter’s 
(1942)  classic  focus  on  ‘creative  destruction’.  Penrose’s  (1959)  work  on  endogenous 
innovation  and  growth  adds  credence  to  the  view,  which  has  been  taken  on  by 
mainstream IO too, to explain inter-temporal efficiency (Baumol, 1991). 
 
 
   5 
------------------------------  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------ 
 
The  importance  of  human  resources  (the  quantity,  quality  and  relations  between 
managers,  workers  and  entrepreneurs)  in  the  context  of  the  cohesive  shell  of  the 
organisation  is  also  an  all  present  theme,  from  Smith  (1776),  through  Marx  (1959), 
Schumpeter (1942), and Penrose (1959) to modern management and human resources 
theory, e.g., Pfeffer (1998), and the endogenous growth models in economics, e.g., Lucas 
(1988). 
 
Unit costs economies need slightly more elaboration. They refer to economies of scale 
and  scope  (a  la  Chandler,  1962),  but  also  learning  and  growth  (Penrose,  1959), 
transaction costs (Coase, 1937) and external Porter (1990), (Krugman, 1991). All these 
authors  emphasise  the  critical  role of  unit  cost  economies  in efficiency,  productivity, 
reduction of costs and thus, value creation. 
 
By firm infra-structure we refer to a firm’s systems and routines, while by structure - to 
its internal organisations form (for example, U-form, M-form, heterarchy, etc.). We adopt 
the conventional definition of strategy, as the pursuit of a long-term objective supported 
by the requisite allocation of human and other resources for its implementation. The role 
of  strategy  and  firm  infra-structure  is  examined  in  the  huge  literature  on  strategic 
management, see, for example, Grant (2005) for an extensive coverage. Strategy is of 
essence in increasing efficiency and productivity and effecting product differentiation by 
reducing  transaction  and  production  costs  and  by  increasing  perceived  value  –  it  is, 
therefore, an important determinant of value creation. The role of a firm’s systems and 
routines has been explored by the RBV and Nelson and Winter (1993). The importance of 
organisation form is discussed among others by Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1981) 
for whom the choice of a firm’s internal structure is of essence in carrying out a strategy, 
increasing efficiency and productivity, acquiring and upgrading knowledge and (thus) 
adding value.    6 
 
The  four  major  determinants  or  value  creation  form  an  interacting  self-reinforcing 
system.  Strategy  and  infra-structure  impact  on  innovation,  unit  cost  economies  and 
human  resources  in  ways  well  documented  in  the  literature  we  already  cited,  e.g., 
Chandler (1962). Human resources impact on the other three determinants, indeed they 
are the source of both strategy and innovation, and affect init cost economies through 
their productivity, effectiveness, ingenuity and imagination. Unit cost economies enable 
strategy,  innovation  and  the  use  and  upgrading  of  human  resources  and  are  in  turn 
affected be all three other factors 
 
 
Value capture is the concern of firms, but also individuals and nations. Assuming that a 
firm has been able to produce a useful, innovative product, the fundamental question 
becomes how to obtain the maximum possible net present value (NPV) of the anticipated 
future income streams of this innovation. In addition, the firm, innovator or not, has the 
wider consideration of how to capture the maximum possible value created by other firms 
too. This is the essence of competition. Through efficiency, power, strategy, ingenuity 
and luck, firms need to out-compete rivals in order to capture value. In general, firms can 
capture less, equal or more value than the one they have created through their activities. 
The size of the pie captured by a firm will mainly depend on two factors: first, their 
market power, for example, enabled through structural and strategic barriers to entry, as 
in Porter (1980). In addition, it will depend on the ability of a firm to create ‘impregnable 
bases’ as described by Penrose (1959) and the RBV, for example, Peteraf (1993), and 
more generally differentiate the firm, vis-à-vis its competitors, thus creating intra-firm-
based  barriers  to  entry.    In  addition  to  these  determinants  of  value  capture,  ‘generic 
strategies’ (a la Porter, 1985) and integration, diversification and cooperation strategies, 
as in Coase (1937), and the RBV, for example, Teece (1986), can help capture value. 
However,  ‘generic  strategies’  (cost  reduction  and  product  differentiation),  as  well  as 
integration,  cooperation  and  diversification  strategies  are  also  critical  determinants  of 
value creation.  We explore these issues in the context of Figure 2. 
   7 
------------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 2  ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
In Figure 2 market power and ‘impregnable bases’-type strategies are seen to mainly aim 
at capturing value, generic to strategic mainly creating, and integration strategies to both 
creating  and  capturing  value.  Total  value  created  is  the  sum  total  of  all  firms  value 
creation efforts. Value captured by Firm A is a subset of the total. It can be equal, larger 
or smaller than the value created by the Firm itself, as represented by the inner ring. 
 
How  large  will  firm  A’s  share  depends  on  its  ability  to  out-compete  rivals,  through 
devising  and  implementing,  appropriate  and  effective  value  capture  strategies.  While 
crucial from the firm’s perspective, from the point of view of the society as a whole, a 
more important question is what type of firm strategy and industry structure is more 
amenable to increasing (or decreasing) the overall pie (extend of shrink the boundaries of 
the outer circle in Figure 2). This is tantamount to addressing the relationship of the four 
major strategies to sustainable value creation.  
 
This is an intricate and complex issue to answer comprehensively, but as a rule, firm 
value capture strategies will tend to shrink the pie if they thwart innovation and the other 
determinants  of  value  creation,  and  extend  it  if  they  impact  positively  on  the  value 
creation determinants, notably innovation.
1 It is widely recognised that entry deterrence 
and monopolistic practices result in value destruction, see, for example, Penrose (1959), 
and in early IO literature that focuses on the welfare losses of monopoly power (e.g., 
Scherer  and  Ross,  1990).  Building  ‘impregnable  bases’  has  more  complex  effects.  It 
could lead to value destruction if it restricts competition and innovation, but it could also 
                                                 
1 The emphasis on innovation is justified by the observation that inter-temporally innovation can 
be applied to, and thus improves, all other determinants of value creation.   8 
serve to internalise the forces of creative destruction (Penrose, 1959), and/or afford firms 
a breathing space, for example, to capture the value of their innovation efforts. 
2 
 
Similar  considerations  apply  to  integration,  cooperation  and  diversification  strategies. 
They  help  firms  to  create  and  capture  value,  but  they  may  also  result  in  restricting 
competition. For example, vertical or horizontal integration may serve as barriers to entry 
and/or sources of monopolistic power respectively (Porter, 1980). Even generic strategies 
that  are  mainly  value  creating  can  help  firms  capture  value  through  product 
differentiation and cost advantages, serving as a barrier to entry, as detailed extensively in 
early IO theory, from Bain (1956) to Porter (1980, 1985). In every case the acid test is the 
impact of strategy on innovation. This is an issue that goes beyond firms and business 
strategy to corporate governance, the organisation of industry, and the economy as a 
whole, but also to public policy.  
 
 
The conventional approach to corporate governance links value creation to maximisation 
of shareholder value, see Mahoney (2006). Assuming that managers may pursue different 
objectives, the aim of shareholder value maximisation boils down to incentive alignment 
between owners and managers, see Jensen and Meckling (1976). Maximising shareholder 
value, however, need not engender sustainability. A wider economic and institutional 
context  that  effects  checks  and  balances,  through  ‘enlightened’  management, 
competition, pluralism and diversity of institutional and organisational form, which can 
lead  to  mutual  monitoring  and  stewardship,  are  likely  to  be  necessary  to  ensure  that 
corporate strategy for value capture does not undermine sustainable value creation, see 
Moran and Ghoshal (1999) and below. 
 
Industry-wide, the theory and evidence point to ‘big-business’ competition, combined 
with small firm creation and clusters of small (and large) firms, being more conducive to 
innovation;  than  perfectly  competitive,  perfectly  contestable,  or  monopolistic  markets 
                                                 
2 Indeed even conventional entry deterrence strategies may play this role in certain cases of, for 
example,  rapid  technological  change  and  (thus)  hyper  competition.  Under  such  conditions 
expectations of normal profits may be a disincentive for innovation (Baumol, 1991)   9 
(see Baumol, 1991). Such forms of market structure reduce incentives to innovate, by 
eliminating above normal profits (contestability) or competition (monopoly), see Penrose 
(1959), Baumol (1991), Porter (1998), and Krugman (1991). 
 
Yet,  neither  institutional  and  organisational  pluralism,  nor  ‘best-practice’  industry 
organisation  can  ensure  sustainability  by  themselves.  The  reason  is  that  firms  value 
capture strategies may lead to value destruction through monopolistic practices (Penrose, 
1959). Public policy may be required to ensure that value capture does not undermine 
value creation, It can include competition, industrial and regulation policies that aim to 
effect sustainable value creation by enhancing competition and contestability, facilitating 
innovation,  SME  and  cluster  creation  and  upgrading,  big  business  competition  for 
innovation,  a  level  playing  field,  the  elimination  of  corruption.  Clearly,  despite 
democratic  credentials,  public  policy  too  may  not  be  captured  by  organised  groups 
(Olson, 1971) and clearly corruption is not a term unknown to policy makers. This brings 
back  the  issue  of  diversity  and  pluralism,  which  can  help  effect  some  checks  and 
balances. We return to such considerations in the context of sustainability in Section 5. 
 
 
FROM FIRMS TO INDUSTRIES, REGIONS AND NATIONS 
 
The nature and determinants of value creation at the national level has not traditionally 
been  a  major  concern  of  management  theory,  being  rather  dominated  by  economic 
theory. A notable exception is Moran and Ghoshal (1999) who explore the role of firm 
and markets on value creation and macro-economic development, by synthesising and 
extending  extant  Penrosean,  Schumpeterian,  transaction  costs  and  resource-based 
contributions to management and economic literature. Besides exploring the determinants 
of value creation at the firm levels our paper aims to go further by also discussing the 
impact  of  value  capture  on  sustainable  value  creation  and  providing  on  empirical-
econometric test of our framework. 
   10 
The  determinants  of  value-wealth  creation  was  the  theme  of  the  founding  father  of 
economics, Adam Smith. In his Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith attributed the wealth-
creating abilities of market economies to the “visible hand” of the firm and the “invisible 
hand” of the market. In analysing his “pin factory”, Smith observed how specialisation, 
the division of labour, teamwork and invention, create value and engender productivity. 
The marvels of the “visible hand” are enhanced further by the “invisible hand” of the 
market – the free interplay of demand and supply by economic agents in pursuit of their 
own interest. The invisible hand helps provide information, incentives, co-ordination, and 
realise value through exchange. Competition can ensure that “natural” prices will tend to 
emerge. Restrictive practices by, for example, “people of the same trade” will endanger 
this result, calling for restraint and/or public policy
3.  
 
In the neoclassical marginalist tradition, that followed and gradually dominated economic 
thinking, the focus shifts from value-creation in production and realisation in markets, to 
exchange relationships, subjective value and efficiency in resource allocation. The aim of 
economics becomes one of “economising”, of rational choices between ends and scarce 
means which have alternative uses, (Robbins, 1935). Given scarcity, rationality and the 
need for economising, the economic aim becomes one of achieving an efficient allocation 
of scarce resources. 
 
Efficient  allocation  has  a  static  and  an  inter-temporal  dimension.  The  former  can  be 
achieved through perfectly competitive markets, the latter through innovations. Unlike 
static efficiency, perfect competition or perfect contestability (a market with free entry 
and costless exit) need not lead to intertemporal efficiency, as it removes the incentive to 
introduce  innovations  –  the  Schumpeterian  reward  of  (transient)  “excess  profits”,  see 
Baumol (1991). For Baumol (1991) the best type of market structure from the point of 
view of intertemporal efficiency is big-business competition. The potential presence of 
                                                 
3  In  this  tradition,  Joseph  Schumpeter  (1942)  later  emphasised  the  role  of  innovation  and  creative 
destruction as a determinant of economic performance. Edith Penrose (1959) reinvented but also extended 
the  classical  tradition,  by  explaining  firm  endogenous  growth  through  intra-firm  knowledge-creation, 
leading to “excess resources”, which serves as an incentive for endogenous growth. Building on Penrose, 
Richardson (1972) pointed to the ubiquitous nature of inter-firm co-operation, in forms other than price-
collusion.   11 
increasing returns, originally pointed to by Allyn Young (1928), suggests that imperfect 
market structures could well be inevitable, too.
  
 
Despite such and other challenges, neoclassical economics and economists seem to share 
a belief that perfectly competitive markets and free trade can deliver sustainable value 
creation. This is despite the existence of large MNEs. While the latter are an obvious 
instance of “oligopoly” (thus, alleged “market failure”), it is believed that MNEs can be 
agents  of  efficiency  and  global  wealth  creation.  The  recognition  of  “imperfect 
competition” and increasing returns leads to the possibility of “strategic trade”, yet the 
practice  of  strategic  trade  is  questioned  due  to  “government  failures”  and  possible 
retaliatory  behaviour,  see  Krugman  (1990).  In  all,  it  is  arguable  that  neoclassical 
economic theory fails to explain efficient allocation of resources, let alone value/wealth-
creation at the national level.  
 
The absence of a satisfactory framework on national competitiveness, which moreover, 
accounts for the potentially crucial role of firms, and industries, has led Porter (1990) to 
propose his now well-known ‘Diamond of Competitive Knowledge of Nations’. In his 
‘Diamond’  Porter  combines  factor  conditions  (from  traditional  neoclassical  economic 
theory,), with demand conditions (earlier encountered in Vernon’s (1966) product line 
cycle theory of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), firm structure, 
strategy and rivalry (from management and IO theory and his own earlier contributions, 
e.g., Porter (1980, 1985)) and related and supporting industries, a very good idea that 
draws on earlier works on ‘industrial districts’ and ‘clusters’ (see, for example, Pyke, 
Becattini et al (1990) for a survey). The four factors are said to interact and create the 
conditions for national competitiveness. Rare and difficult to replicate factors are good 
(for value capture a RBV idea), sophisticated demanding consumers challenge firms to 
innovate,  domestic  rivalry  is  good  and  preferable  to  competition  from  foreign  firms, 
related and supporting industries help create ‘clusters’. Clusters enhance productivity and 
innovation (Porter, 1998). FDI is a sign of competitive advantage, outward investment 
being even a measure of national competitiveness (Porter, 1990). 
   12 
Despite  extensive  critiques  (see,  for  example,  Hill,  2005  for  an  account)  Porter’s 
‘Diamond’ has met considerable success, especially commercial one – helping create, for 
example, a whole new industry for cluster diagnosis and upgrading. However, Porter did 
not  even  attempt  to  integrate  his  earlier  firm  and  industry  level  analysis  with  the 
“diamond”, he did not explore the relationship between value creation and value capture, 
he paid little attention to the issue of sustainability, in particular the impact of firms and 
nations value capture strategies on sustainable (global) value creation.  
 
In contrast to Porter’s approach, our framework on the determinants of value creation at 
the firm level, lends itself readily to aggregations at the meso and national levels. In 
particular, the determinants of value creation at the meso, industry, regional and national 
levels are the same as those for the firm level, when suitably reinterpreted to refer to 
meso or nation-wide infra-structure and strategy, human resources, unit cost economies 
and innovation and technology and also when extended to capture special “meso” and 
macro characteristics. For example the meso level one has to consider the industry-wide 
structure, and performance, the ‘degree of monopoly’ (Cowling, 1982) and the regional 
milieu (Porter, 1998). At the macro level, one has to consider the national context, which 
includes the macroeconomic policy mix and the nature and level of effective demand. 
These impact upon the context within which firms and industries operate and determine 
the current “size of the market”, and (thus) the value that can be realised at any point in 
time.  The  macro  level  also  includes  the  institutional  context  and  in  particular  the 
“governance-mix”,  which  is  the  “market-hierarchy-cooperation”  mix  of  economic 
governance.    The  institutional  environment  is  crucial  as  it  provides  “sanctions  and 
rewards”, culture and attitudes and the overall “rules of the game” (North, 1991, Moran 
and Ghoshal, 1999). The “governance-mix” determines the overall efficiency of the mode 
through which the whole economy operates. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------- 
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The attached “Wheel of the nation” is finally influenced by the global context.  This is the 
sum of each nation’s ‘wheel’, their synergies, and the institutions and organisations of 
global governance.  These impact upon the size of the global market, and the overall 
ability of ‘The world’ to generate value and wealth. 
 
The firm has centre stage in the wheel.  It is the organisation par excellence in the history 
of humankind for its ability to create value-wealth.  This is particularly the case for large 
firms and MNEs (Penrose, 1959; Chandler, 1990; Hymer, 1979), and larger and smaller 
cooperating firms in the context of regional ‘clusters’ (Porter, 1998), see Figure 4.  These 
impact positively on the determinants of value-wealth, notably unit cost economies, and 
innovativeness (Porter, 1998).   
 
------------------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
Another  important  ‘actor’  is  the  government.      It  may,  and  does,  influence  the 
institutional and macroeconomic context, through laws, regulations, ‘leadership’ etc. It 
can  affect  the  meso-environment  through  its  competition,  industrial  and  regulation 
policies and the macro-environment through its macroeconomic policies. It can impart 
upon the determinants of productivity and value and wealth, through education and health 




AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
In  this  section  we  construct  the  requisite  nation-level  variables  that  derive  from  our 
analysis so far to test for the determinants of value creation. Below we explain our choice 
of variables, choice of econometric technique and the obtained results. 
   14 
Data description and considerations 
 
We use panel data and time-series, cross-section techniques on various grounds. In panel 
data estimation, variations over both the cross-section and time series dimensions are 
considered jointly. This has the advantage of using all available information enabling us 
to control better for the effects of missing or unobserved variables, something that is not 
attainable  with  pure  cross-sectional  or  time  series  data.  Additionally,  the  panel  data 
approach  increases  the  degrees  of  freedom,  producing  more  efficient  estimates.  This 
approach, with a large panel dataset, should moderate the problems of multicollinearity 
that otherwise bedevil inferences about growth obtained solely from time series data. 
Moreover, use of panel data allows the estimation of long run relationships with fewer 
problems than with time series data; in particular, it moderates the problems otherwise 
involved in estimating relationships between integrated series. (See Baltagi (2001) for 
detailed discussions of the merits of using panel data.) 
 
Our dataset covers seventeen (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, and United States) developed (OECD members) countries for the period 1971 
to  2000.  The  choice  was  determined  by  data  availability  coupled  with  another 
consideration  as  regards  the  cross-sectional  dimension.  Durlauf  and  Johnson  (1995), 
Canova (1999) and Krueger and Lindahl (2000) argue that neither data nor theory support 
the assumption of parameter homogeneity in such analyses. The relative importance of 
factors  affecting  performance  might  be  different  for  countries  at  different  stages  of 
development. This leads us to select a group of countries that are at comparable levels of 
development. Another concern is the lower data quality in developing countries’ national 
accounts (Schultz, 1999). Given these problems, we choose to focus on OECD countries. 
The sample seems representative for the entire OECD. Firstly, it includes all members of 
the G-7, next some of OECD’s smaller countries. Secondly, also non-EU countries are 
present in the sample. The number of cross-sections relative to the time dimension also 
allows  us  to  use  econometric  approaches  that  require  the  number  of  time  series 
observations to be greater than the number of cross section observations. 
   15 
Specifically, the dataset contains the following variables: 
 
--------------------------------  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------  
 
GDPPC  is  the  dependent  variable  and  is  used  as  an  indicator  for  aggregate 
productivity/value  creation.  USPTO  is  an  indicator  of  research  and  development-
innovation activity. Since there are usually huge differences among different patenting 
systems (Soete, 1987; Fonfria et al., 2001) we use the number of patent applications in a 
single country, specifically the United States. NOS serves as an indicator of realised 
profits.  RULC  represents  price-competitiveness.  Aggregate  demand  pressures  are 
captured by GAP, see Table 1. All education variables are used as proxies for human 
resources-capital.  
 
In terms of our model, the following points require elaboration. First, the profit share 
aims  to  capture  both  (effective)  strategy  and  infrastructure,  but  also  the  ‘degree  of 
monopoly’ and ‘regional milieu’ as they impact on national productivity. Unit labour 
costs aim to proxy Unit Costs Economics, in that the last mentioned result in reduced unit 
costs, Unit Labour Costs being the best proxy available for this. The role of FDI is self-





Our general specification is: 
Productivity/Value Creation=f(Profit, R&D, Education, Demand, Foreign direct 
investment, Unit labour costs) 
   
Fixed and random effects 
The identification of fixed and random effects models has been widely discussed in the 
literature. When the cross-sectional units are randomly drawn from a large population,   16 
random effects model is appropriate. Whereas, when the interest lays on specific cross-
sectional units, fixed effects model is appropriate. The countries under investigation can 
be classified as developed. Hence the choice of the countries is not random and a fixed 
effects’  approach  seems  more  plausible.  Another  important  consideration  regards  the 
omitted  variable  bias,  a  problem  that  pertains  especially  growth  and  competitiveness 
empirical  research,  since  the  factors  that  can  plausibly  affect  them  seems  limitless. 
Durlauf (2003) discriminates between two sets of regressors: those (few) provided by the 
Solow  growth  model  and  those  proposed  by  the new  growth  theories.  This  latter  set 
contains  a  vast  number  of  potential  regressors,  which  cannot  be  included  since  the 
number of available observations is not that large. Utilizing fixed effects estimation can 
reduce the omitted variable bias as the country-specific factors that are fixed over time 
are eliminated (Forbes (2000); Arjona et al. (2001)). 
 
To test the fixed effects versus the random effects model we employ the Hausman test. 
The test statistic is 237.52. This statistic is asymptotically Chi-square distributed with 6 
degrees  of  freedom.  The  random  effects  model  can  be  rejected  at  any  conventional 
critical level. Consequently we proceed with the fixed effects model. In each case our 
regression equations follow the same form using the one-way fixed effects model (Least 
Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) with country-specific intercepts). 
 
------------------------------  





The generalized regression model is Yit = αi +βi ’xit + eit, 
 
In this setup, assumptions for consistency and efficiency of OLS estimator are: 
1.  E(ei)=0, for all i 
2.  E(eiei’)=σe
2I, for all i   17 
3.  E(eiej’)=0 if i different from j 
 
The  first  assumption  states  that  the  unconditional  mean  of  the  error  term  is  zero.  A 
constant σe
2 for all i means no cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and identity matrix IT*T 
means  no  autocorrelation  over  time  within  each  cross-section.  The  third  assumption 
implies no cross-sectional correlation. The last notion is analogous to serial correlation 
but it examines the residuals across cross-sections rather than time. The coefficients and 
intercepts  are  BLUE  (best  linear  unbiased  estimator)  under  these  assumptions.  When 
these  assumptions  hold  OLS  may  be  used  for  fixed  effects  model  estimation  (Sayrs, 
1989). However, these conditions rarely hold (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). 
 
The  application  of  formal  tests  based  on  the  LSDV  results  reveals  problems  of 
heteroscedasticity,  serial  correlation  and  cross-sectional  correlation.  Specifically, 
following Greene (2000) the Breusch-Pagan statistic for cross-sectional independence in 
the residuals of a fixed effect regression model was computed. In order to test for serial 
correlation we have used the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002). This tests for serial 
correlation  in  the  idiosyncratic  errors  of  linear  panel  data  models.  Drukker  (2003) 
presents simulation evidence that this test has good size and power properties. Finally, a 
common deviation from homoskedastic errors in the context of pooled cross-section time-
series data (or panel data) is likely to be error variances specific to the cross-sectional 
unit. To test for group-wise heteroscedasticity a modified Wald statistic following Greene 
(2000) has been used.  
 
The tests reveal several problems that rend the fixed effects estimator inefficient and 
biased,  thus  unreliable.  The  BLUE  Gauss-Markov  condition  does  not  hold.  Thus  the 
application of LSDV in the presence of non-spherical disturbances will lead to inefficient 
estimates and biased standard errors. This implies that the results of the LSDV estimator 
should be taken with caution and that another estimation technique is needed. 
 
One possible remedy is the use of Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS), which 
produces efficient estimates and unbiased standard errors. In this case two sequential   18 
transformations are conducted: first eliminating serial correlation and then eliminating 
contemporaneous correlation of the errors. However, Beck and Katz (1995) identify a 
number of problems concerning the use of feasible GLS and recommend simple OLS 
regression plus panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) as a more precise estimation of 
TSCS  data.  They  argue  that  GLS  tends  to  give  over-confident  estimation  of  the 
coefficients by underestimating the errors. According to Beck and Katz (1995), simple 
OLS  coefficient  estimates  are  inefficient  but  consistent;  the  degree  of  inefficiency 
depending on the data and the exact form of the error process. Therefore, they propose a 
panel-corrected  standard  errors  procedure to  derive  more  accurate  estimations  for  the 
errors while retaining the OLS coefficient estimates. Their Monte Carlo simulation shows 
that their approach is much more accurate than GLS. Another virtuous property of PCSE 
is that it is able to account for cross-sectional correlation when the time dimension of the 
data is less than the number of cross-sections, whereas FGLS cannot. However, they 
acknowledge that GLS provides an efficiency advantage over PCSE in extreme cases of 
cross-sectional correlation, but only when the number of time periods is at least twice the 
number of cross-section units. Chen, Lin and Reed (2005) confirm Beck and Katz’s result 
that FGLS consistently underestimates coefficient standard errors. However, they also 
find that while PCSE generally estimates standard errors more accurately than FGLS, it 
sometimes produces standard errors that are unreliable. They suggest the use of both 
estimators, relying on the PCSE estimates for hypothesis testing, while on FGLS for 
coefficient estimates. 
 
Therefore  we  continue  by  estimating  a  feasible  GLS  correcting  both  for 
heteroscedasticity  and  cross-sectional  correlation  assuming  an  idiosyncratic  AR(1) 
process for each cross-section. Additionally taking into consideration the reservations that 
Beck and Katz have expressed we have also estimated the model with Prais-Winston 
panel-corrected standard errors.  
 
Description of Results 
 
Equation 1   19 
The following equation was estimated for annual data: 
GDPPCi,t= αi + β1RULCi,t + β2NOSi,t + β3FDIINi,t + β4GAPi,t + β5EDUi,t + β6USPTOi,t 
+ei,t 
 
where i denotes the country and t the time indicator. 
 
The results obtained are reported in Table 3. 
 
--------------------------------------------  




In  brief, coefficients have the expected signs and both GLS and PCSE indicate that they 
are highly significant. Profits, inward FDI, expenditure on education, demand and patents 
have a positive effect on value creation while unit labour costs have a negative effect. All 
these are very much in line with the implications from our framework in the previous 
sections.  PCSE  tends  to  give  higher  standard  errors  than  LSDV  and  FGLS.  The 
magnitude of the coefficients does vary between estimators but not extremely. 
 
Fischer (1993) finds that inflation rate has a negative effect (-0.0310) on performance. So 
does Barro (1995). Although inflation and unit labour costs share some attributes they are 




The  estimation  results  are  based  on  annual  observations.  However,  there  are  some 
concerns expressed by various authors on this point, specifically how to extract the long 
run information of this annual data. As Barro (1997) points out, data will more likely be 
influenced by measurement error and short-term disturbances. One method to circumvent 
this  issue  is  to  estimate  the  model  with  annual  data  but  to  use  many  lags  of  the 
independent  variables  to  capture  long-run  effects  (e.g.  Kocherlakota  and  Yi,  1997).   20 
However, it is more common to use five-year averages in order to smooth over cyclical 
fluctuations  with  the  consequent  loss  of  degrees  of  freedom  (e.g.  Grier  and  Tullock, 
1989;  Devarajan,  Swaroop  and  Zou,  1996;  Kneller,  Bleaney  and  Gemmell,  1999).  
Therefore we have also constructed a second dataset consisting of five-year averages. In 
this  dataset  we  have  been  able  to  incorporate  data  from  Barro  and  Lee  (2000)  on 
educational attainment but this comes at the cost of reduction of the degrees of freedom. 
Now expenditure on education is replaced by average years of schooling devoted in each 
level of education. In this case we cannot use FGLS to correct for contemporaneous 
correlation since the time dimension (T=6) is less than the cross-sectional dimension 
(N=17). Therefore only LSDV and PCSE results are presented. 
 
Equation 2 
The estimation equation was: 
GDPPCi,t= αi + β1RULCi,t + β2NOSi,t + β3FDIINi,t + β4GAPi,t + β5HYRi,t + β6SYRi,t + 
β7PYRi,t +β8USPTOi,t +ei,t 
 
where i denotes the country and time indicator t denotes the non-overlapping five-year 
periods from 1971-1975 through 1996–2000. 
 
The results are summarized in Table 4. 
 
---------------------------------------  




Once again, all coefficients have the expected signs. Compared to the annual data results 
(Table 3) the coefficients of all variables with the exception of inward foreign direct 
investment are significantly reduced.  This can be attributed to the substitution of the 
education variable. PCSE suggest that all estimates are significant with the exception of 
primary education. This confirms the findings of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) although   21 
their analysis is placed in an economic growth context. Moreover, like Barro and Sala-i-
Martin  (1995)  and  Agiomirgianakis,  Asteriou  and  Monastiriotis  (2002)  the  estimated 
coefficient for average years of higher schooling is greater in magnitude compared to the 
coefficient for average years of secondary schooling, which in turn is higher than the 
coefficient  of  average  years  of  primary  schooling.  The  role  of  Demand  is  now  less 
important, as its p-value is slightly above 10% (0.119).  
 
Equation 3 
We have also utilized the Barro-Lee data on educational attainment. Specifically as an 
alternative  measure  of  human  resources  we  have  used  data  on  percentage  of  the 
population that have reached each level of education. 
 
The estimation equation became: 
GDPPCi,t= αi + β1RULCi,t + β2NOSi,t + β3FDIINi,t + β4GAPi,t + β5LHi,t + β6LSi,t + β7LPi,t 
+β8USPTOi,t +ei,t 
 
where i denotes the country and time indicator t denotes the non-overlapping five-year 
periods from 1971-1975 through 1996–2000. 
 
The results are summarized in Table 5. 
 
--------------------------------  




The  new  coefficients  also  have  the  expected  signs.  All  estimates  are  statistically 
significant  at  the  conventional  levels  of  significance.  A  comparison  with  the  results 
presented in Table 4 reveals that the coefficients of the variables that are present both in 
Table 4 and Table 5 are generally unchanged. As regards the education variables we still 
observe  the  linear  relationship  between  the  level  of  educational  attainment  and  the   22 
magnitude  of  the  coefficient.  A  peculiar  result  is  the  negative  coefficient  of  primary 
education. Still, since our sample consists of only developed countries this might reflect 
the higher relative importance of secondary and tertiary education on these countries’ 
productivity  while  primary  education  might  yield  positive  effects  in  less  developed 
countries.  In  fact  Psacharopoulos  (1994)  in  a  global  case  study  indicated  that  less 
developed countries relied heavily on primary education while higher education seems to 
have  a  greater  effect  in  developed  countries.  Equation  2  utilises  average  years  of 
schooling as  a  human  resources  indicator.  In equation  3 this  human  capital indicator 
consists of educational attainment of persons that most probably have completed their 
formal education. Therefore the higher the percentage of people that attended primary 
education  only,  the  lower  the  corresponding  percentages  for  secondary  and  tertiary 
education and hence a negative effect on the competitiveness of developed countries. 
 
In all, our results are in support of our framework on value creation. However, our results 
too, do not address the issue of sustainability to which we turn.  
 
 
SUSTAINABILITY, ITS PRE-REQUISITES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
POLICY  
 
For  the  process  of  value  creation  to  be  sustainable,  crucial  economic,  social  and 
environmental prerequisites need to be in place. Sustainability is threatened primarily 
when there exists a power structure that allows an agent to pursue its own interest in 
value capture, in a way that undermines value creation. Typical examples include firms 
and governments that abuse the environment, excessive inequalities in distribution within 
and between countries,  ‘strategic trade’ policies by (in particular) developed countries 
that undermine a level-playing field, regulatory capture of the state by organised groups, 
‘deals’  between  MNEs  and  governments  of  emerging  economies  that  restrict  trade, 
monopolistic, collusive and restrictive policies by firms, corruption by policy makers, 
attempts by governments of developed countries to ‘attract’ valuable human resources 
from developing and emerging economies.   23 
 
Despite  wide-held  beliefs  that  market  forces  can  address  all  of  these  problems,  for 
example through ‘win-win’ environmental strategies by firms (see, for example, Porter 
and van der Linde (1998), the underlying conditions and requisite power structures that 
effect sustainability are rarely discussed.  
 
A way to approach this issue is by recognising the existence of a multiplicity of layers of 
decision making, therefore potential sources of threats to sustainability, and explore the 
requirements for diffusing such threats, for example, through monitoring and objective 
alignments. 
 
Starting first from the controlling group of the firm (here, the ‘agent’) and the corporation 
as an entity comprising of the sum of its stakeholders (here, the ‘principal’), it can be that 
the pursuit of personal interests by the former compromise those of the latter.  This, for 
example,  is  the  case  when  the  former  pursue  strategies  that  favour  short-term,  share 
valuation growth and personal compensation packages and perks, which are beyond those 
required  to  provide  them  with  adequate  incentives  to  pursue  the  interest  of  the 
corporation as a whole, that is, sustainable value creation and capture.  This undermines 
sustainability of the corporation as a whole and has legitimately led to the extensive focus 
of recent corporate governance debates on this issue.   
 
The  second  layer  is  that  of  the  corporation  as  the  agent  and  the  government  as  the 
principal.  The ability of firms to realize value-wealth can, and often does, lead them to 
attempt to appropriate wealth as ‘rent’ through monopolistic and restrictive practices.  A 
high  degree  of  market  power  can  thwart  incentives  to  innovation  and  be  inimical  to 
productivity and value-creation.  
 
In  this  context,  the  government  (and  its  governance)  becomes  crucial.      Sustainable 
productivity  value-wealth  creation  requires  competition  and  regulation  policies  that 
thwart  the  creation  and  use  of  monopoly  power  (while  allowing  for  an  innovations-  24 
inducing  “degree of monopoly”), and adopt policies to support small firm creation and 
survival, as well as the diagnosis and upgrading of regional clusters.  
 
In  the  third  layer,  nations  themselves  (now  the  agents)  can  try  to  capture  wealth  by 
adopting strategic trade policies that can harm the process of global wealth creation.  The 
aim  of  the  ‘global  community’  (now  the  ‘principal)  should  be  to  require  individual 
governments to adopt policies that enhance global productivity and value-wealth creation.  
Indicatively,  governments  of  developed  economies  should  refrain  from  policies  that 
restrain trade, yet recognise the need of developing countries to  ‘foster’ infant firms and 
industries, for their expected competition, innovation and productivity effects.  
 
Going back human resources, are there relationship, it is clear that disaffected labour is 
likely to be less productive (Pfeffer, 1998), which may undermine the very purpose of the 
corporation  and  its  controllers.    In  this  context,  employees  become  a  privileged 
‘stakeholder’.  This is not just because employees too invest in firm-specific assets (as do 
shareholders), but also notably because they are a crucial determinant of a firm’s ability 
to exist. 
 
The absence of global knowledge (and a global monitor) may call for diversity.  In any 
country or society, a host of other organisations and institutions exist – the family, the 
church, NGOs, and (even!) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – that can affect, in their 
interaction, the ability of firms’ and governments’ incentives to play the productivity and 
value-wealth enhancement process (see Moran and Ghoshal, 1999).  In this context the 
issue  is  the  specialization  and  division  of  labour  of  alternative  institutions  and 
organisations,  based  on  their  relative  advantages  and  competencies  in  production, 
exchange,  legitimacy,  ideology  and  culture,  and the  identification  of  institutional and 
organisational  configurations  and  conducts  that  promote  efficiency  in  the  form  of 
enhanced productivity, value and wealth.  Competition and co-operation, self-interest and 
altruism, big businesses and smaller co-operating firms in clusters, can impact positively 
on value creation. 
   25 
Sustainability  of  value-  creation  requires  appropriate  environmental,  distribution  and 
social policies, including migration, which also follow endogenously from our proposed 
perspective. Excessive inequities in distribution, the abuse of the environment, the exodus 
of  educated  human  resources,  can  thwart  a  country's  ability  to  sustainably  generate 
wealth. Policies designed to deal with such problems are also part of a government's 
remit,  with  a  proviso.  Governments  should  make  use  of  market  prices  to  render  the 
actions  of  “offenders”  expensive  (e.g.  tax  pollutants,  require  emigrants  to  developed 
countries to return public funds-subsidies provided for their education, etc). The use of 
non-market measures should in general be avoided: it thwarts incentives, and leads to the 
path  of  authoritarianism,  with  predictable  consequences.      In  the  absence  of  a  “Dr 
Pangloss”, an approximate way of effecting sustainable wealth creation is through the 
free interplay, pluralism and diversity of institutions, organisations, individuals, ideas, 
cultures,  religions,  norms,  customs  and  civilizations,  as  each  can  serve,  in  part,  as  a 
‘steward’ or ‘monitor’ for the others. Having said this, it is crucial that this process is 
“managed”, “guided”, and “moulded” through informed agency, so that democracy is 
married  to  performance.    This  brings  our  discussion  of  ‘governance’  centre-stage.  A 
fundamental  question  is  whether  different  types  of  power  structures  intra  and 
international and (thus) (global) governance may impact differently on sustainable value 
creation. This, however, is a very complex issue for further research. 
 
For our purposes here, suffice is to note that for (corporate) governance to contribute 
towards sustainable value and wealth creation, internal and also external controls are 
required,  including  national  and  global  incentives  and  sanctions.    Importantly,  it  is 
necessary  to  eliminate  corruption  at  all  levels:  intra-firm,  intra-country  (regulatory 
capture) between host governments and multinationals, and internationally.  All these 
presuppose a degree of trust, social capital and the ‘ethical dimension’. Exclusive focus 
on self-interest may well be the strongest foe of sustainability. As the Economist (June 
18, 2003) points out, government should be “pro-market, not pro-business”.  We would 
also propose ‘pro-sustainability’. 
 
   26 
CONCLUDING REMARKS, LIMITATIONS, FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In a globalising world value can be created everywhere and also be captured everywhere. 
An objective of many economic agents is to capture value at a faster rate than its peers – 
to be competitive. For this game not to undermine the sustainability or the value/wealth 
process itself, (the objective we believe one should adopt for the globe as a whole) one 
has to discuss both the determinants of value/wealth creation, and the prerequisite for its 
sustainability, to involve the ‘right’ power structure. This is not always the case, and 
crucially these important issues are often not even addressed. The three (plus one) levels, 
firms, meso, national, (and global) are never bridged. 
 
We  suggested  that  the  theory  of  value  creation  (and  capture)  requires  a  synthesis  of 
resource allocation and resource creation but also the identification of the requisite power 
structures that allow value creation not to be undermined by value capture. We developed 
a perspective on the determinants of value/wealth creation at the firm, meso and national 
levels, and have tested it for 17 OECD countries, with overall promising results. We have 
then discussed the limitations of extant theory of the firm concerning governance and 
value  in  its  context,  and  explored  some  prerequisites  of  sustainability.  Sustainability 
requires both internal and external controls, to include the market, but also hierarchy 
(firm and state), as well as institutional and global controls. Institutional diversity and 
pluralism  can  help  effect  mutual  ‘stewardship’  and  monitoring.  For  sustainable  value 
creation, corporate governance needs to be aligned to national and global governance, in 
a  way  that  thwarts  the  potentially  negative  impact  of  some  agents’  pursuit  of  value 
capture on sustainable value creation. Such include environmental, social and economic 
degradation. In our context corporate, social and environmental responsibility, but also 
requisite public policies are part and parcel of the need for sustainable value creation. 
Eliminating corruption at all levels is a crucial prerequisite.  
 
There are various limitations in our analysis. First, we have only tested for value creation 
at the national level, and not for value capture at either the macro or national levels. 
Moreover, we did not test for value creation and the firm industry and/or regional levels.   27 
Also, our discussion on sustainability derives from our framework, but remains at the 
level of educated assertion. Our result support the national level framework, and only by 
implication the lower-level arguments. As a result of aggregation problems, it may be that 
our results at the macro level would not be replicated at the micro and meso levels. We 
are currently working on all these issues and hope to motivate others. We also hope that 
by bridging the three (plus one) levels and testing the integrative framework, adds value 
to extant theory (and evidence) and is a step in the right direction. Yet, we also realize the 
limitations and the need for further research. 
   28 
Data References 
 
For each database we provide hyperlinks. Some of them are publicly accessible while 
others require registration. We have made every attempt to keep the dataset used up to 
date. 
 





Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2000), "International Data on Educational 
Attainment: Updates and Implications", Center for International Development at Harvard 
University, Working Paper No. 42, April 2000. 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
 
UNCTAD (undated), “Foreign Direct Investment Interactive Database”, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3199&lang=1 
 
USPTO (2004), “Number of utility patent applications filed in the United States by 




WDI (2005), “World Development Indicators Database 2005”, The World Bank. 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ 
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FIGURE 3 
The determinants of productivity, value and wealth at the  
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FIGURE 4 
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TABLE 1 
Definition, Description and Sources of Variables 
 
Variable  Descrition  Source 
GDPC  GDP per capita (constant 1995 US dollars)  WDI (2005) 
 
USPTO  Utility patent applications filed in the U.S.  USPTO (2004) 
FDIIN  Foreign direct investment inflows (millions 
of US dollars) 
UNCTAD (undated) 
NOS  Net operating surplus adjusted for imputed 
compensation of self-employed: total 
economy (millions of 1995 US dollars)  
AMECO (2005) 
RULC  Real unit labour cost index: total economy 
(1995=100) 
AMECO (2005) 
EDU  Total spending on education as a percentage 
of GNI 
WDI (2005) 
GAP  Gap between actual and trend GDP at 1995 
market price as percentage of trend GDP. 
AMECO (2005) 
LP  Percentage of the population aged 25 and 
over that have received only primary 
education 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
LS  Percentage of the population aged 25 and 
over that have reached secondary education 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
LH  Percentage of the population aged 25 and 
over that have reached tertiary education 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
PYR  Average years of primary schooling in the 
total population over age 25 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
HYR  Average years of higher schooling in the 
total population over age 25 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
SYR  Average years of secondary schooling in the 
total population over age 25 
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TABLE 2 
Fixed and random effects estimation 
 
  Fixed effects 
(LSDV) 
Random effects 

























2(6)    2167.45 
R
2  0.8522 (within)  0.8469 (within) 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 













   42 
TABLE 3 
TSCS estimation (T=29, N=17) 
 
  LSDV  FGLS  PCSE 





































2 (22)    9380.30  7925.69 
R
2  0.8522 (within)  Not Applicable  0.9991 
 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance respectively. All estimations were carried out with fixed country effects. 
FGLS and PCSE are corrected for heteroscedasticity, panel-specific autocorrelation and cross-
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TABLE 4 
Panel estimation (T=6, N=17) 
 
 
  LSDV  PCSE 
Log(RULC)  -.0929392    
(.066352) 
-.1073423**   
(.050033) 
Log(NOS)  .1647115***   
(.0297902) 
.1660655***   
(.0391075) 
Log(FDIIN)  .0106255    
(.007795) 
.0142087**   
(.0062271) 
GAP  .0039408   
(.0039931) 
.0047078*   
(.0030173) 
HYR  .4065242***   
(.1003755) 
.4222366***   
(.0888806) 
SYR  .0675261***   
(.0217388) 
.078254***   
(.0189706) 
PYR  .0358272   
(.0468332) 
.0072849   
(.0291376) 
Log(USPTO)  .0801125***   
(.0333983) 
.0538696*   
(.0289491) 
Wald X
2 (19)    2.20e+06 
R
2  0.9302 (within)  0.9998 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance respectively. All estimations were carried out with fixed country effects. 
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TABLE 5 
Panel estimation (T=6, N=17) 
 
 
  LSDV  PCSE 1 
Log(RULC)  -.0985243   
(.0636243) 
-.10246**   
(.0466211) 
Log(NOS)  .157264***   
(.0298372) 
.1546349***   
(.0408254) 
Log(FDIIN)  .0121512   
(.0076132) 
.014125**   
(.0070658) 
GAP  .0040364   
(.0039805) 
.0045172*   
(.0027626) 
LH  .0161347***   
(.0031155) 
.0162646***    
(.002749) 
LS  .0041052**   
(.0020678) 
.003827***   
(.0010563) 
LP  -.0014991   
(.0026519) 
-.0023032*   
(.0013253) 
Log(USPTO)  .0805617**   
(.0324814) 
.0643332**   
(.0292269) 
Wald X
2 (19)    569592.89 
R
2  0.9302 (within)  0.9998 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance respectively. All estimations were carried out with fixed country effects. 
PCSE    is  corrected  for  heteroscedasticity,  panel-specific  autocorrelation  and  cross-sectional 
correlation.  
 
 
 